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Race and the War on Drugs
Michael Tonryt
"Take no prisoners," a slogan of wars ruthlessly fought, has
asits equivalent in the War on Drugs launched and conducted by
the Reagan and Bush administrations, "make them all
prisoners." American prison and jail populations tripled between
1980 and 1993,1 primarily due to increased numbers of drug con-
victions2 and longer sentences for drug offenders.' These pat-
terns, the intended effects of recent drug policies, might have
been justifiable if there had been grounds when the war was first
launched in 1988 and 1989 for believing that drug use was in-
creasing or that tougher penalties would reduce drug trafficking.
To the contrary, drug use in America had been declining since
the early 1980s,4 and there existed no plausible grounds for be-
lieving that increased penalties would reduce drug trafficking.
The War on Drugs included law enforcement, treatment, and
educational components, but the White House Office of National
Drug Control Policy ("ONDCP") loudly proclaimed that emphasis
should be given to law enforcement. One sign of the law enforce-
ment emphasis was an ONDCP insistence, year after year, that
federal funding be split 70-30 in favor of law enforcement over
other programs.5 Another sign was its persistent refusal to ac-
cept a "treatment on demand" approach to drug treatment even
when it was known that tens of thousands of drug users in cities
wanted but could not gain admission to treatment programs.6
t Michael Tonry is Sonosky Professor of Law and Public Policy at the University of
Minnesota and, during 1994-95, visiting fellow of All Souls College, Oxford.
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Trends in the U.S. Correctional Populations: Recent
Findings From the Bureau of Justice Statistics table 1 at 1 (1994). See also Bureau of Jus-
tice Statistics, Historical Statistics on Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions, Year-
end 1925-1986 (1988).
2 See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-1992
table 5.15 at 486 (1993).
' 1992 Sourcebook, table 5.69 at 538 (cited in note 2); Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-1982 table 5.11 at 479 (1983).
See page 29.
Office of National Drug Control Policy ("ONDCP"), 1990 National Drug Control
Strategy-Budget Summary 100 (1990).
" See Dean R. Gerstein and Henrick J. Harwood, eds, Treating Drug Problems 230
(National Academy Press, 1990).
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Three effects of the War on Drugs stand out. First, in its own
terms, it was a failure. Its ostensible goals were to reduce drug
use and trafficking. Drug policy analysts generally use drug pric-
es as a measure of law enforcement effectiveness; if drugs are
harder to find, they should be more expensive. The street price of
cocaine, the War's signature drug, should have risen if dealing
was becoming riskier and drugs less available; prices fell.7 Mas-
sive arrests and street sweep tactics in many cities, backed up by
harsh mandatory prison sentences, should have cleared out the
drug dealers and made drugs harder to find; they did not. Most
analysts and many police officials believe that arrested street
dealers are nearly always replaced by others who are willing to
take the risks in order to gain incomes not otherwise available in
high poverty neighborhoods.' Finally, there is no evidence that
crime control efforts reduced levels of drug use in the United
States. Drug use was declining years before the War was de-
clared,9 and the War can claim no credit for the continuation of
pre-existing trends. There are reasons to believe that mass media
and public education initiatives reduced drug use, especially
among school age people, but that is a different matter.
Second, although the War accomplished few if any of its
goals, it did so at great cost. The doubling of arrests in the 1980s,
combined with harsher penalties, more than doubled the police,
jail, prosecution, and court case flows and costs associated with
drugs.' °
The War's effects on prisons and correctional programs were
even greater. Drug offense sentences are the single most impor-
tant cause of the trebling of the national prison population since
1980. In the federal prisons, for example, drug offenders consti-
tuted 22 percent of admissions in 1980, 39 percent in 1988, and
42 percent in 1990." In 1980, 25 percent (4,912) of federal pris-
oners were drug offenders; by 1991, 56 percent (30,754) were
drug offenders; and by 1992, 59 percent were offenders. 12 Guard-
ing, housing, feeding, and caring for all these prisoners costs a
great deal. Typical estimates of the average annual cost of hold-
ing one prisoner range from $20,000 to $30,000.'1 Typical esti-
ONDCP, Price and Purity of Cocaine 6 (1992).
See page 70.
See page 29.
10 See, for example, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Sta-
tistics-1990 table 5.10 at 478 (1991).
" 1992 Sourcebook, table 6.87 at 638 (cited in note 2).
12 Id table 6.85 at 636.
" See Douglas C. McDonald, The Costs of Operating Public and Private Correctional
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mates of the cost of building new prisons, depending on climate
and security level, range from $50,000 to $200,000 per prison-
er.14 Not untypically for American government, many of those
costs were not paid from current tax revenues. Construction costs
often were paid with borrowed money, to be repaid with interest
in future years. Operating costs are paid from current revenues;
the future burden will come from debt service and the need to
continue year after year to pay to house drug offenders sentenced
to ten-, twenty-, and thirty-year sentences.
Third, as if the ineffectiveness and immense, avoidable cost
were not indictment enough, they pale before the most funda-
mental objection. The War on Drugs foreseeably and
unnecessarily blighted the lives of hundreds of thousands of
young, disadvantaged Americans, especially black Americans,
and undermined decades of effort to improve the life chances of
members of the urban black underclass. The War was fought
largely from partisan political efforts to show that the Bush and
Reagan administrations were concerned about public safety,
crime prevention, and the needs of victims (as if Democrats, or
any responsible mainstream political figure, were not). The bod-
ies counted in this war, as they lay in their prison beds, however,
are even more disproportionately black than prisoners already
were. War or no war, most people are surprised and saddened to
learn that for many years, 30 to 40 percent of those admitted to
prison were black.15 The law enforcement emphasis of the War
on Drugs was foreordained to increase those percentages, and it
succeeded.
This essay presents the evidence on which the preceding ob-
servations are based and explains from both an ethical and policy
perspective why the War on Drugs, because of its implications for
black Americans, should never have been launched, and why
American drug policies should be radically altered. I first exam-
ine whether on substantive, as opposed to ideological or partisan
political, grounds there was any reason to launch the War on
Drugs. I then trace out the effects of the Drug War on disadvan-
taged young people; because of the particularly heavy burdens
borne by the War's black victims, the emphasis of this essay is on
Facilities, in Douglas C. McDonald, ed, Private Prisons and the Public Interest 103 (Rut-
gers University Press, 1990).
"4 See McDonald, The Costs of Operating Public and Private Correctional Facilities at
106 (cited in note 13).
" Michael Tonry, Racial Disproportion in United States Prisons, 34 British J Crim-
inol 97, 101 (1994).
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them. I consider why so many young blacks were willing to risk
injury, death, or prison in order to sell drugs, and why policyma-
kers should have taken this into account in formulating govern-
ment policy. Finally, I show why the War's planners should be
held morally accountable for what they have done to damage
young black Americans.
I. WHY THE WAR SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DECLARED
The Reagan administration's declaration of a war on drugs
resembles Argentina's declaration of war against Nazi Germany
in 1945.18 It was late and beside the point. Just as it was clear
by 1945 that Germany was in military decline, it was clear in
1987 that drug use was in decline in the United States, and that
it had been since the early 1980s.
There was no need in the late 1980s for a War on Drugs.
Although good-faith arguments could be made for continuing ef-
forts to target major importers, distributors, and traffickers, for
increased support for drug education programs in schools, and for
drug treatment for those who wanted it, none could be made for
vastly increased emphasis on law enforcement directed at users,
user-dealers, and street-level trafficking. Nor could good faith
arguments be made for widespread enactment of mandatory pen-
alty laws or for harsher penalties in general. The ostensible goal
of the drug war was to diminish drug abuse, and that goal, evi-
denced by a steady and continuing decline in drug use, had been
achieved before the war began. By all available measures of drug
use in the general population, use of the major illicit substances,
except cocaine, began to decline in the early 1980s, and the use of
cocaine declined from the mid-1980s onward. 7
By some disingenuous measures, the War on Drugs was
bound to succeed, and both President Bush and William Bennett,
the first "Drug Czar" and ONDCP director, made these disingen-
uous claims. Thus, in December 1990, citing data on long-term
drug use trends showing a 44 percent decline since 1985 in the
number of people who use illegal drugs monthly, President Bush
said, "I am pleased to say that the news we have today suggests
that our work is paying off, and that our national strategy is hav-
" Argentina, in William H. Harris and Judith S. Levy, eds, The New Columbia Ency-
clopedia 43 (Columbia University Press, 1975).
7 See Figures 1-1 to 1-6.
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ing an effect." 8 Both William Bennett and Louis Sullivan, Sec-
retary of Health and Human Services, made similar claims.'9
Because of the long-term decline in drug use, any comparison
of levels of use in 1985, before the ONDCP was established, with
levels of use in 1989 and 1990, after the war was launched,
would appear to demonstrate that toughened drug laws and en-
forcement practices had deterred people from buying and using
drugs, and accordingly that the war had succeeded. This is a mis-
take commonly made when attempting to understand the effects
of legal or policy changes. A simple comparison of conditions be-
fore and after the change will be misleading if there is a long-
term trend of which both years are a part, in which case the
change may have had nothing to do with events in the world. A
homely example: a healthy ten-year-old child, if given cucumber
sandwiches for lunch every day for a year, will be taller and
heavier at year's end; a claim that the cucumbers caused the
child to grow would be incorrect. The child might have grown
more or less or in different ways on a different diet, but figuring
that out requires more sensitive research designs than a simple
before and after comparison. And so it is with drug use; year-to-
year changes are meaningless except in the context of known
long-term trends.
Figures 1-1 to 1-6, all based on surveys of large representa-
tive samples of the United States population conducted for or by
the National Institute on Drug Abuse (generally referred to as
"NIDA"), show steady downward trends in use of dangerous sub-
stances over long periods for different age groups. All are based
on surveys in which sample members are asked, in confidence, to
answer questions about their use and frequency of use of dif-
ferent substances. 0
Figure 1-1 provides data for the period 1975-1991 from a
series of annual surveys on drug use by high school seniors. The
samples are huge, ranging between 15,000 and 18,000 students
per year.2 Figure 1-1 shows the percentages admitting to any
use of marihuana, cocaine (any form), heroin, or alcohol during
"' Thomas Ferraro, Bush Releases Upbeat Report, says Drug War "Paying Off', Unit-
ed Press International (Dec 19, 1990).
"' See Timothy J. McNulty, United States Report Finds Teen Drug Use Still Falling,
Chi Trib 3-8 (Feb 14, 1990); Bennett Says He Leaves Winning Legacy, USA Today 2A (Nov
13, 1990).
' See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-1987
575 (1988).
21 Id.
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the preceding twelve months. Because "any use" includes even a
single use, this is the broadest measure of use and includes
casual one-time experimenters. For each substance, reported use
declined. Heroin use fell but from a very low starting point. The
percentage reporting marihuana use began at 40 percent in 1975,
climbed to 51 percent in 1979, and fell continuously thereafter to
24 percent in 1991. The pattern is similar for cocaine, but with a
later peak and a steeper drop. Fewer than 6 percent reported use
in 1975, followed by a rise to 12 percent in 1979; reported levels
of use fluctuated around 12 percent, reaching a 13 percent peak
in 1985 after which there was a precipitate drop to 3.5 percent in
1991. Even alcohol follows the same pattern, rising to a modern
high in 1979 and falling thereafter to a level in 1991 below the
starting point.
Figure 1-1
Reported Drug Use (within last 12 months)
U.S. High School Seniors, 1975-91
90-
80-
70-
SAlcohol
60- Marihuana
S Cocaine
# # Heroin
50-
30r
975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987  1989 1991
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-1987
table 3.66 at 281 (1988); Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice
Statistics-1991 table 3.92 at 346 (1992).
RACE AND THE WAR ON DRUGS
It is, of course, possible that casual use of drugs might have
been declining while regular use by smaller numbers of people
was increasing. If so, the decline in drug use shown in Figure 1-1
might be misleading. Figure 1-2, however, shows that the num-
ber of frequent users was also declining.
Figure 1-2 shows data from the same source on the percent-
ages of high school seniors reporting use of marihuana, cocaine,
alcohol, or cigarettes within the preceding thirty days. Heroin is
omitted because levels of use are so low (usually since 1976, 0.2
percent). Cigarettes are included because they confirm the
general trend toward decreasing levels of use by young people of
addictive substances.
Figure 1-2
Reported Drug Use (within last 30 days)
U.S. High School Seniors, 1975-91
80-
70"
60-
50-
S40-
0.
30-
20 -
- Alcohol
Marihuana
-Cigarettes
- - - Cocaine
- - - -
- -
1975 1977 1979 1481 1983 1985 1987 1989 1491
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-
1987 table 3.67 at 282 (1988); Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal
Justice Statistics-1991 table 3.93 at 347 (1992).
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Most of those reporting drug use in the preceding thirty-day
period covered in Figure 1-2 are likely to be occasional or regular
users. Some presumably were one- or few-time experimenters
who just happened to conduct their experiments immediately be-
fore the survey was conducted. The ratio of regular to
experimental users may change over time, with experimentation
falling, but steady users persisting. If that were true, the trend
lines in Figure 1-2 should be very different from those in Figure
1-1. They are not. It thus appears that both experimental and
regular use were falling.
The trend lines in Figure 1-2 closely resemble those in Fig-
ure 1-1. The cigarette pattern is striking because it anticipates
the pattern for alcohol and illicit drugs. The percentage reporting
cigarette use within the preceding thirty days climbed to 39 per-
cent in 1976, fell steeply to 30 percent, around which it fluctuat-
ed from 1980 to 1985, and thereafter declined to 28 percent in
1991.
To show that the patterns in the high school surveys are real
and believable, Figures 1-3, 1-4, 1-5, and 1-6, encumbered with
less textual summary and description, present data from the
other major long-term surveys of Americans' drug use. Figure 1-3
shows trends in self-reported use within the preceding thirty
days of marihuana, cocaine, alcohol, and cigarettes by full-time
American college students one to four years beyond high
school.22 Heroin is omitted because reported use levels are gen-
erally below 0.1 percent.'
1992 Sourcebook at 718 (cited in note 2).
2 See id table 3.87 at 330.
RACE AND THE WAR ON DRUGS
Figure 1-3
Reported Drug Use (within last 30 days)
U.S. College Students, 1980-91
......... Alcohol
Marihauna
.. .. • Cigarettes
--- - Cocaine
# 
'
1980 81 82 83 84 85 86 81,
- - -
-S
- -
I I I I
88 89 90 1991
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice
Statistics-1991 table 3.95 at 348 (1992).
Because of self-selection, and economic and social back-
ground considerations that lead only some young people to
college, the college survey represents a different and less hetero-
geneous population than the high school surveys. Nonetheless,
the trends are the same as those for high school students. Mari-
huana and alcohol use declined steadily from the early 1980s
onward, cigarette use declined somewhat, and the decline in
cocaine use came slightly later for college than for high school
students but was steeper. That there were steeper declines in
marihuana and cocaine use than cigarette and alcohol use is not
surprising: the latter two, after all, are not illegal substances.
Figures 1-4 to 1-6, based on the National Household Surveys
on Drug Abuse, summarize data on drug use among the Ameri-
40
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can household population aged 12 and over and have been con-
ducted periodically since 1972 for the National Institute on Drug
Abuse and the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and
Alcoholism. The 1990 survey, the tenth conducted, included 9,259
interviews.24
Figures 1-4, 1-5, and 1-6 show percentages of survey respon-
dents reporting use during the preceding year of marihuana, co-
caine, and alcohol. Data are presented separately for respondents
12- to 17-year-olds, 18- to 25-year-olds, and those over 25. For
the two younger age groups, the trends for each substance are
similar to those from the high school and college student surveys.
Only among the oldest age group, those over 25, do the patterns
differ. Most initiation and termination of drug use occurs in the
teenage years or the early twenties. People over 25 who report
drug use are likely to be committed users, and for both marihua-
na (Figure 1-4) and cocaine (Figure 1-5), reported levels of use
fell somewhat by the mid-1980s; thereafter, the curves are flatter
than for the younger groups. For the younger groups, however, as
in the high school and college surveys, marijuana use peaked in
the late 1970s and fell sharply thereafter. For 18- to 25-year-olds,
cocaine use peaked around 1979 and declined thereafter. Finally,
Figure 1-6 shows, for comparison purposes, that self-reported use
of alcohol, a licit drug (except for underage drinkers), peaked in
the early 1980s for each age group and fell sharply after the mid-
1980s.
Figure 1-4
Estimated Prevalence of U.S. Marihuana Use by
Age Group (within last 12 months), Selected Years, 1974-90
50-
40
30
18 to 25 years of age
10- 12 to 17 years of age
26 years and older
1974. 1976 1977 1979 1982 1985 1988 1990
Source: 1991 Sourcebook, table 3.101 at 354.
24 Id table 3.95 at 336.
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Figure 1-5
Estimated Prevalence of U.S. Cocaine Use by Age Group (within
last 12 months), Selected Years. 1972-90
30
10 18 to 25 years of age
26 years and older
0 -- I 12 to 17 years of age
1972 1974 1976 1977 1979 1982 1985 1988 1990
Source: 1991 Sourcebook, table 3.101 at 354.
Figure 1-6
Estimated Prevalence of U.S. Alcohol Use by
Age Group (within last 12 months). Selected Years, 1974-90
90-
80 - 18 to 25 years of age
70 26 years and older
60-
50-- - 12 to 17 years of agea 40-
30
20-
l0
174 194 1974 174 1974 194 1974 194
Source: 1991 Sourcebook, table 3.101 at 354
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Something was changing American attitudes toward drugs in
the 1970s and early 1980s, long before the politics of crime con-
trol led the Bush administration to establish the ONDCP and
appoint a Drug Czar. We can only theorize why that was happen-
ing. It is too soon for social histories to be written, and explana-
tions inevitably fall into the realm of pop sociology. The cigarette
and alcohol trends are important because they signal a broadly
based and widely shared change in American attitudes toward
ingestion of dangerous or unhealthy substances that can have
little to do with the deterrent effects of law enforcement strate-
gies or criminal sanctions. If NIDA had surveyed Americans on
their use of caffeinated coffee since the 1970s, the use trends
would probably resemble those for cigarettes and alcohol. The
Department of Agriculture does measure food consumption per
capita over time. Coffee consumption per person in the United
States fell by a fifth between 1970 and 1990, from 33.4 gallons
per person to 26.7,25 and consumption of most fatty and high
cholesterol foods fell sharply, including red meat (from 132.0
pounds per capita in 1970, to 126.4 pounds in 1980, and to 112.4
pounds in 1990), whole milk (from 213.5 pounds per person in
1970, to 141.7 pounds in 1980, and to 87.6 pounds in 1990), and
lard (from 4.6 pounds per person in 1970, to 2.2 pounds in
1990).26
No doubt for a variety of reasons-a reaction to the hedo-
nism of the 1970s, growing concern for personal health and fit-
ness, and a resurgence of social puritanism-Americans in the
late 1970s became less enamored of drugs of most sorts and less
inclined to use them. Only cocaine followed a somewhat different
trajectory, with use peaking later (but still before the declaration
of war), and then declining more steeply.
The steep decline in drug use was well known among public
officials and drug policy scholars in the late 1980s when the drug
wars were initiated. Although specialized statistical reports like
those published by the National Institute on Drug Abuse are sel-
dom seen or read by lay people or journalists, they are well
known among professionals. Only the wilfully blind could have
failed to know that no war was needed.
Something else was known about American drug policy that
should have made government officials especially hesitant to
28 Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States-1993 table 220 at
143 (1993).
26 Id.
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launch a war. Well-documented historical experience instructs
that policymakers overreact in formulating and executing anti-
drug policies at times when social mores are becoming less
accepting of drug use and use is falling. David Musto, the leading
historian of American drug policy, notes that "in the decline
phase of drug use... [wie tend to have an overkill, that is to say
people become so righteous and so zealous that we can have
excesses in the name of fighting drugs. There is very little opposi-
tion to draconian policies because no one wants to stand up for
using drugs."27
Musto has described a cyclical pattern of American tolerance
and intolerance of alcohol and drugs. At least three times since
the beginning of the nineteenth century, the United States has
moved from periods of widespread, tolerated, even approved rec-
reational use of alcohol and drugs to puritanical periods of un-
compromising prohibition. The first period of intolerance began in
the 1820s and culminated in the prohibition of alcohol in a dozen
states by the 1850s. The temperance movement of the late nine-
teenth century led to national Prohibition; more generalized in-
tolerance of drug use and. users produced the first major federal
narcotics legislation, the Harrison Act of 1914, and the first fed-
eral marihuana law, the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937. The contem-
porary period of intolerance began around 1970, a cusp during
which the United States Congress repealed most mandatory sen-
tencing laws, many concerned with drug crimes, because they
were too harsh, and as a result were too often evaded by judges
and lawyers uncomfortable with imposing what they viewed to be
unjust sentences. Also by 1970, however, the Nixon administra-
tion had declared its war on drugs. Within a few years, New
York was widely portrayed as suffering a heroin "epidemic,"
which was followed in the 1980s by successive cocaine and crack
epidemics in various parts of the country.2"
Public tolerance of drug use has declined. Mandatory penal-
ties for drug crimes have proliferated, and are now the harshest
in the nation's history; many drug dealers now face mandatory
prison terms of up to thirty years and life-without-possibility-of
parole, especially in the federal system and often in cases in
7 David Musto, in Jeffrey Roth, Michael Tonry, and Norval Morris, eds, Drugs and
Crime: Workshop Proceedings 42 (1987) (report of the 1986 National Academy of Sciences
Conference of Drugs and Crime Research).
' David Musto, The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic Control 244-77 (Oxford
University Press, 1987).
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which tiny amounts of drugs are involved. Indeed, the Supreme
Court in Harmelin v Michigan' upheld the constitutionality of
life sentences without possibility of parole for traffickers with no
prior criminal record. Drug testing of an extent and intrusiveness
that would have been unthinkable twenty years ago is now com-
monplace.
The important lesson to be drawn is not about the details of
drug policy history, but about the cycles that characterize public
tolerance of drug use. According to Musto, live-and-let-live atti-
tudes prevailed during periods of tolerance, such as the 1890s
and 1960s. In the 1890's, for example, cocaine and opium (includ-
ing derivatives) were widely used in patent medicines, and co-
caine was generally seen as a harmless recreational drug. ° In
the 1960s and 1970s, marihuana was widely and openly used; it
and many hallucinogens were seen by many as recreational
drugs that were less harmful than alcohol.31
During such periods of relative tolerance, traditional Ameri-
can notions of individualism and personal autonomy prevail, drug
use is widely seen as only mildly, if at all, deviant, and people
are comfortable arguing in favor of the benefits of drug use, for
individuals' rights to make their own choices, and against state
intrusion into people's private behavior. In periods of intolerance,
by contrast, drug use is widely seen as deviant, and few people
feel comfortable risking moral disapproval or stigmatization by
arguing in favor of drug use or tolerance of drug users.32
The most intrusive laws and the cruelest penalties tend to be
enacted after intolerance has reached its peak and when drug use
is already falling.3 That is when self-righteousness is most un-
compromising and voices in favor of tolerance are least audible.
Those with reservations, particularly elected officials, are reluc-
tant to speak out for fear of being disparaged as "soft on drugs."
And that is where the danger lies.
We know from personal experience that overreactions are
likely when we are angry or overwrought. There are times when
we are upset and our better judgment tells us that we are likely
to act rashly or unfairly. Anger and emotion sometimes result in
outraged letters which, our cooler self knows, should be put aside
29 501 US 957 (1991).
0 Musto, The American Disease at 3, 5 (cited in note 28).
31 See id at 264.
32 See id at 251.
See id.
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and reread tomorrow. When tomorrow comes, our cooler selves
often win out and no letter is sent, or a different one is sent.
Similarly, parents know that their own anger or tiredness or
frustration can lead to overreaction to children's behavior. Either
we listen to our doppelganger's warning to get hold of ourselves
and not take out our frustrations on the child, or we do not, and
we feel guilty afterwards. When we are angry or upset, we tend
to overreact. In private life we try to restrain these impulses. In
public life, another doppelganger is talking, but policymakers too
seldom listen.
Musto has described the dynamic that characterizes a period
of declining tolerance:
Soon the trend reverses; drug use starts to decline fast-
er and faster. Public opinion turns against drugs and
their acceptability begins to evaporate. Gradually, drug
use becomes associated, truthfully or not, with the low-
er ranks of society, and often with racial and ethnic
groups that are feared or despised by the middle class.
Drugs begin to be seen as deviant and dangerous and
become a potent symbol of evil.34
The key words are "drug use becomes ... associated with the
lower ranks of society and often with racial and ethnic groups
that are feared or despised by the middle class." Throughout this
century, in periods of high intolerance of drug use, minority
group stereotypes have been associated with deviant drug use.
Early in this century, although mainstream women were the
modal category of opiate users, images of Chinese opium smokers
and opium dens were invoked by opponents of drug use and form
part of the backdrop to the Harrison Act.35 Cocaine was also cov-
ered by the Harrison Act, in part, Musto reports, because of anti-
black sentiments in the South and the fear that black users
might "become oblivious of their prescribed bounds and attack
white society."" In the 1930s, imagery linking Mexicans to mar-
ihuana use was prominent in the anti-marihuana movements
that culminated in the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937 and in many
state laws prohibiting marihuana use7.3 In the anti-drug hyste-
Daniel Kagan, How America Lost Its First Drug War, Insight 8 (Nov 20, 1989).
Id at 10-13.
Musto, The American Disease at 6 (cited in note 30).
7 See, for example, Richard J. Bonnie and Charles H. Whitebread II, The Marihuana
Conviction: A History of Marihuana Prohibition in the United States 72-76 (University
Press of Virginia, 1974).
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ria of the 1980s, crack cocaine, the emblematic drug of the latest
war, is associated with disadvantaged minority residents of the
inner cities.
Given what we know about past periods of intolerance of
drug use and tendencies to scapegoat minority groups, and given
that disadvantaged urban blacks are the archetypal users of
crack cocaine, and therefore the principal possessors, sellers, and
low-level distributors, anyone who knew the history of American
drug policy would have foreseen that this war on drugs would
target and mostly engage young disadvantaged members of mi-
nority groups as the enemy. And it has.
A policy that would foreseeably damage many young blacks
and Hispanics was bad enough; this one, however, was worse
than it appeared, because the damage to minority-group mem-
bers would be inflicted primarily for the benefit of the great mass
of mostly white, non-disadvantaged Americans. Explaining why
requires some discussion of how laws influence behavior and a
look back at our knowledge from NIDA surveys of drug use pat-
terns since 1975.
Politicians proposing new, tougher laws tend to argue that
longer sentences will deter or incapacitate prospective offenders.
The research evidence on the deterrent and incapacitative effects
of penalties is ambiguous and inconclusive, 8 but there is no
basis for believing that altering penalties for most kinds of crime
will significantly affect behavior. This is especially true of many
drug crimes. Declining cocaine prices and the common experience
that arrested dealers are replaced on the streets within days sug-
gest that traditional law enforcement strategies are an ineffective
way to diminish drug use.39
There is, however, a broader way to think about how crimi-
nal laws operate that goes back at least to Emile Durkheim, one
of the nineteenth century pioneers of modern sociology. Durk-
heim proposed that laws operate in diffuse ways to define and
reinforce social norms. The criminal laws define the outer limits
of acceptable behavior, and they change over time and as differ-
ent groups espousing different values achieve greater or lesser
influence. In thinking about the effects of criminal laws, we
See Report of the Panel on Research on Deterrent and Incapacitative Effects, in
Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen, and Daniel Nagin, eds, Deterrence and Incapacita.
tion: Estimating the Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Criminal Rates 46 (National Acad-
emy Press, 1978).
"' Peter Reuter, Robert MacCoun and Patrick Murphy, Money from Crime-A Study
of Drug Dealing in Washington, D.C. (Rand Corporation, 1990).
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should look not simply to their direct short-term effects but also
to what modern philosophers like the Norwegian Johannes
Andenaes call their moral-educative effects. The announcement,
application, and enforcement of laws have dramaturgical proper-
ties that are part of the process by which individuals' values and
beliefs are shaped and sustained. Apprehension, trial, and pun-
ishment of wrongdoers bring home the inappropriateness of their
behavior. Social learning occurs in part by example. Most people
abstain from crime not because of the immediate threat of penal-
ties but because they are socialized to believe that the behaviors
are wrong; they are not the kind of people who are tempted (or
tempted enough) to do such things. Thus, at least in part, crimi-
nal law shapes behavior not only through the short-term deter-
rent effects of legal threats but also dramaturgically by reinforc-
ing values and norms that make people less likely to commit
crimes."
The notion that law affects behavior indirectly no doubt is
correct, although at best it can only be a partial explanation of
why people obey laws. However, it has the problem that it is
amoral. If laws exist to underscore norms about the boundaries of
legitimate behavior, legitimacy and hence criminality will depend
on what groups' values are ascendant. In Germany in the 1930s,
for example, Goebbels might have argued that laws forbidding
political dissent and authorizing denial of legal and human rights
of Jews should be vigorously enforced, not only to achieve short-
term instrumental objectives, but also to help shape German
mass public opinion to support the policies and credos of National
Socialism.
Marxists argue that the class interests of those who control
the means of production dominate government and that laws are
biased in favor of the wealthy and their values. Hence, Anatole
France's aphorism that the law in its majestic equality forbids
the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the
streets, and to steal bread. Similarly, feminists argue that many
laws reflect traditional male domination of society and that gov-
ernment expresses "patriarchal" values and male interests. Mem-
bers of minority groups argue that many laws reflect traditional
white domination of society and government. Bias in favor of
whites is illustrated by the contrast between aggressive enforce-
ment and strict penalties for violent and common law property
David Garland, Sociological Perspectives on Punishment, in Michael Tonry, ed, 14
Crime and Justice: A Review of Research 115, 123 (University of Chicago Press, 1991).
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crimes, which blacks disproportionately commit, and alleged half-
hearted enforcement and trifling penalties for white collar finan-
cial and environmental crimes, which whites disproportionately
commit. 41
Laws, including criminal laws, are not disembodied timeless
statements of eternal values. In the United States, it would be
difficult to deny that politicians and officials respond to and rep-
resent the interests of the great mass of the population whose
behavior is captured in the NIDA surveys. Thus it might be ar-
gued that the goal of the War on Drugs in an era in which drug
use is declining is to reinforce values and norms that are influ-
encing the decline and, through dramas of crime and punish-
ment, repeatedly to affirm that drug use is immoral and wrong.
That argument assumes, however, that there are no competing
values that are violated by the use of law to shape norms. There
are.
The moral problem with the rationale of the War on Drugs
as an exercise in moral education is that it destroys the lives of
young people, principally members of minority groups, in order to
reinforce existing norms of the political majority, most of whom
are white. Put crudely if explicitly, the lives of black and
Hispanic ghetto kids have been destroyed in order to reinforce
white kids' norms against drug use.
At the same time that the NIDA surveys were showing
broad-based declines in drug use in the late 1980s, two other
drug use indicators, drug-related admissions to hospital emerg-
ency rooms and urinalyses of felony defendants across the coun-
try, suggested stable or rising levels of drug use. Figure 1-7,
based on a NIDA-sponsored reporting program called the Drug
Abuse Warning Network ("DAWN"), shows drugs involved in
drug-related emergency room admissions in hospitals in metro-
politan areas from 1980 to 1990. Contrary to the patterns shown
in the NIDA surveys, the DAWN data indicate that mentions of
cocaine, heroin, and marihuana increased slowly but steadily
through mid-decade, and rapidly thereafter.
41 See, for example, Clarence Lusane, In Perpetual Motion: The Continuing Signifi-
cance of Race and America's Drug Crisis, 1994 U Chi Legal F 83, 95-102.
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Figure 1-7
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the Justice System 11 (1992).
The differences between the NIDA and DAWN data series
may be less surprising than initially appears. People admitted to
hospital emergency wards are, after all, likely to be the heaviest
abusers of drugs. Data from a number of sources suggest that
three to five years typically separate the initiation of drug use
from the onset of acute medical disorders.42 If that is so, the
peak of cocaine emergency room admissions in 1988 followed by a
decline in 1989 is consistent with peaks in self-reported use in
1985, with declines afterward.
Even greater discrepancies with the NIDA survey findings
are revealed by urinalyses of felony arrestees conducted in Amer-
ican cities since 1987 as part of the Justice Department's Drug
Use Forecasting program ("DUF"). The DUF data show astonish-
ingly high levels of drug use. Up to 80 percent of arrestees test
positive in some cities.43 Table 1-1 shows 1991 findings on posi-
tive urinalyses for male arrestees in twenty-three cities in 1991
for any drug, for cocaine, for marihuana, and for heroin. Positive
test results for any drug ranged from a high in San Diego of 75
percent to a low in Omaha of 36 percent, and for cocaine ranged
downward from highs of 62 percent in Manhattan and Philadel-
42 Denise B. Kandel, The Social Demography of Drug Use, 69 The Milbank Quarterly
380, 383 (1991).
" Drug Use Forecasting: 1991 Annual Report: Drugs and Crime in America 30-31
(National Institute of Justice, 1992).
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phia. Table 1-2 provides comparable data for female arrestees
and shows even higher levels of positive test results, ranging
from a high of 79 percent in Cleveland for any drug to a low of 45
percent in San Antonio, and ranging from a high of 76 percent
for cocaine in Cleveland, to a low of 25 percent in San Antonio.
Table I-I
Percent of Male Arrestees Testing Positive by
Urinalysis for Any Drug, Cocaine, Marijuana, Heroin, 1991
Any.Dru cg aine Mnd Heroin
Atlanta, GA 63% 57 % 12% 3 %
Birmingham, AL 63 52 16 5
Chicago, IL 74 61 23 21
Cleveland, OH 56 48 12 3
Dallas, TX 56 43 19 4
Denver, CO 50 30 25 2
Detroit, MI 55 41 18 8
Fort Lauderdale, FL 61 44 28 1
Houston, TX 65 56 17 3
Indianapolis, IN 45 22 23 3
Kansas City, MO 53 37 18 1
Los Angeles, CA 62 44 19 10
Manhattan, NYC 73 62 18 14
Miami, FL 68 61 23 2
New Orleans, LA 59 50 16 4
Omaha, NE 36 14 26 2
Philadelphia, PA 74 62 18 11
Phoenix, AZ 42 20 22 5
Portland, OR 61 30 33 9
St. Louis, MO 59 48 16 6
San Antonio, TX 49 31 20 16
San Diego, CA 75 45 33 17
San Jose, CA 58 33 25 8
Washington, DC 59 49 11 10
Note: Drugs tested for include cocaine, opiates, PCP, marijuana,
amphetamines, methandone, methaqualone, benzodiazepines, barbiturates,
and propoxyphene.
Source: National Institute of Justice Research, Drug Use Forecasting-
1991: Annual Report (1992).
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Table 1-2
Percent of Female Arrestees Testing Positive by
Urinalysis for Any Drug, Cocaine, Marijuana, Heroin, 1991
Cy Cocaine Marijuana Heroin
Atlanta, GA 70% 66% .8 % 4%
Birmingham, AL 62 44 10 11
Chicago, IL - - - -
Cleveland, OH 79 76 7 6
Dallas, TX 56 45 11 9
Denver, CO 54 41 16 2
Detroit, MI 68 62 4 11
Fort Lauderdale, FL 64 55 14 4
Houston, TX 59 52 8 4
Indianapolis, IN 54 26 22 11
Kansas City, MO 64 56 13 4
Los Angeles, CA 75 62 9 18
Manhattan, NYC 77 66 11 21
Miami, FL - - - -
New Orleans, LA 50 42 7 7
Omaha, NE - - - -
Philadelphia, PA 75 64 14 9
Phoenix, AZ 61 45 14 17
Portland, OR 68 40 28 17
St. Louis, MO 54 47 8 7
San Antonio, TX 45 25 9 21
San Diego, CA 73 40 20 21
San Jose, CA 52 30 13 7
Washington, DC 75 68 6 16
Note: Drugs tested for include cocaine, opiates, PCP, marijuana,
amphetamines, methadone, methaqualone, benzodiazepines, barbiturates,
and propoxyphene.
Source: National Institute of Justice Research, Drug Use Forecasting-
1991: Annual Report (1992).
The patterns shown by the 1991 DUF data are remarkably
stable. Figure 1-8 shows positive drug urinalysis test results for
booked felony arrestees in Dallas, Kansas City, Manhattan, San
Diego, Portland, Oregon, and Washington, D.C. for 1988 to 1991.
These six cities were picked because they represent all regions of
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the country. Although the proportions of positive test results
among arrestees vary between cities-around 80 percent in Man-
hattan, 60 percent in Portland and Dallas, and 50 percent in San
Antonio-within any single city they are either stable or declin-
ing slightly.
Figure 1-8
1988 11989 1990 11991
Dallas
1988 1989 1990 1991
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1988 1989 1990 1991
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_ .
-----------
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Kansas C itL
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Notes: Positive by urinalysis. Drugs tested for include cocaine, opiates, PCP, marijuana.
amphetamines, methadone, methaqualone, benzodiazepines, barbiturates, and
propoxyphene. Gaps on graph represent periods when data were not collected.
* Prior to 1991, site did not test for all 10 drugs (listed above).
** 1988 Washington, D.C. data based on arrestees tested by D.C. Pretrial Services
Agency. Drugs tested for by the agency include cocaine, opiates. PCP, amphetamines,
and methadone. Data collected after 1988 are from the DUF program.
Source: National Institute of Justice Research, Drug Use Forecasting-) 991: Annual
Report (1992).
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Most felony defendants, whatever their race, tend to be poor,
ill-educated, un- or underemployed, and not part of a stable
household. Disproportionately, they are black. In 1990, for exam-
ple, 29 percent of all felony arrests were of blacks, as were 44
percent of persons arrested for violent index offenses, and 58 per-
cent of persons arrested for the three most serious
crimes-murder, rape, and robbery." Similar patterns hold
among arrestees included in the DUF program. Table 1-3 shows
positive test results, by race, for males in the twenty-three DUF
cities in 1991 for any drug, and for cocaine, marihuana, and hero-
in. In no city is the percentage of whites testing positive for any
drug or for cocaine higher than the black percentage (although
they are equal or close in some sites), most probably a result of
the different offenses for which people of different races are ar-
rested. A larger percentage of whites than blacks are arrested for
relatively less serious property crimes which are less strongly
associated with drug-using subcultures. It is reasonable to hy-
pothesize that blacks and whites arrested for comparable crimes
and who have comparable criminal records would exhibit compa-
rable patterns of drug use (although perhaps they would use dif-
ferent drugs because of differing subcultural preferences).
" Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-1991 table
4.9 at 444 (1992).
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If such large percentages of arrestees in the DUF program
test positive for drugs, and nearly half of those arrested for the
most serious crimes in the United States are black, that must
mean that drug use among some black groups has remained
high. Moreover, the DUF data show drug use levels that held
stable or declined slightly from 1988 to 1991 while the NIDA sur-
veys showed steady declines in self-reported use. How can those
patterns be reconciled with the NIDA surveys? We now know the
answer: they cannot.
It is now well understood that the NIDA surveys, although
they are a reasonably reliable indicator of drug use by most Ame-
ricans, are not based on a representative sample of the American
population. Like the decennial population counts of the United
States Bureau of the Census and the ongoing National Crime
Victimization Survey conducted for the Department of Justice,
the NIDA surveys undercount young, mobile, inner-city people.
This means that all three purportedly representative surveys
miss large numbers of minority men and women living in Ameri-
can cities. The nature of the NIDA surveys probably exacerbates
this problem. The high school surveys are of high school seniors;
they miss young people who leave school before their senior
year.' Even among registered seniors, truancy rates are high
among disadvantaged students. Students absent when surveys
are administered are likely disproportionately to include disad-
vantaged minority youth." The broadest survey, the National
Household Survey on Drug Abuse, carefully describes its effort as
an attempt "to measure the prevalence of drug use among the
American household population aged 12 and over."47 It therefore
excludes the homeless, people with no permanent residence, and
people institutionalized in jails and prisons. The homeless in-
clude higher-than-normal percentages of drug users.' Those
without permanent residences or in jails or prisons are
disproportionately young, poor, and members of minority
groups.49
The NIDA surveys and other indicators of drug use like
DAWN and DUF are not inconsistent. They simply measure dif-
,' 1992 Sourcebook at 718 (cited in note 2).
See id at 720.
National Institute on Drug Abuse, National Household Survey on Drug Abuse: Pop-
ulation Estimates-1990 1 (1991).
Gerstein and Harwood, Treating Drug Problems at 84 (cited in note 6).
' See 1992 Sourcebook, table 6.78 at 630, table 6.87 at 639 (cited in note 2); Jamshid
A. Momeni, ed, Homelessness in the United States 136 (Greenwood Press, 1989).
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ferent things. Several years ago, Senator Joseph Biden, Demo-
cratic Chairman of the United States Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee, and William Bennett, then head of the White House Office of
National Drug Control Policy, fought a drug policy duel using
little-read government reports as weapons. Bennett, using NIDA
data, claimed that the Bush administration was winning its drug
war.5" Biden riposted, citing DAWN and DUF data, and claimed
that drug abuse was as bad as ever or worse.51
Biden and Bennett were both right. Among the more than 95
percent of the population whose experience is reliably captured
by the NIDA surveys, drug use in the 1980s was declining.2
Among disadvantaged young people in the inner cities, especially
in minority areas of highly concentrated poverty, drug use was
either not declining or not declining as much, and this was cap-
tured by the DUF and DAWN data.
The drug use indicators measure different phenomena, not
unlike the way different oceanographic instruments measure
deep currents and surface perturbations. In the deep currents of
evolving values and norms, Americans in the 1980s were moving
away from use of drugs and other substances perceived as harm-
ful. At the surface, fierce storms were raging. By a variety of
measures, including the concentration of urban poverty, labor
force participation, illegitimate births, single-parent households,
and general deterioration of neighborhoods, things were getting
worse in the inner city in the late 1980s. Increased drug abuse
and drug-related crimes were not unforeseeable correlates and
consequences.
In the longer term, the deeper currents will likely affect most
segments of the population. The social traumas affecting minority
underclass areas buffered those attitudinal changes for some
time, but eventually they should show up in reduced drug use.
Already there are slight indications in the DUF urinalysis data
(see Figure 1-8) of a downturn in positive drug tests among arre-
stees. Because there are no long-term drug-use surveys of youth
in disadvantaged ghetto communities, long-term patterns cannot
be documented. However, data on the high-risk group of truants
show declines in drug use paralleling those of non-truants. 3
" ONDCP, 1990 National Drug Control Strategy 1 (1990).
Majority Staffs of the Senate Judiciary Committee and the International Narcotics
Control Commerce, Fighting Drug Abuse: A National Strategy 11 (1990).
52 See Figures 1-1 to 1-6.
Kandel, Social Demography at 390 (cited in note 42).
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Newspapers like the New York Times and the Washington Post
have recently begun carrying stories reporting that drug use is
falling out of favor with disadvantaged members of minority
groups. A Washington Post story in 1993, for example, was titled
"N.Y. Crack Epidemic Appears to Wane; Seeing Drug's Destruc-
tiveness, Younger People are Turning Away.""
The white-shirted-and-suspendered officials of the Office of
National Drug Control Policy understood the arcane intricacies of
NIDA surveys, DUF, and DAWN better than anyone else in the
United States. They knew in 1988 and 1989 that drug use was
declining among the vast majority of the population. They knew
that drug use was not declining among disadvantaged members
of the urban underclass. They knew that the War on Drugs
would primarily be fought in minority areas of American cities
and that those arrested and imprisoned would disproportionately
be young blacks and Hispanics. If the criminal law's mens rea
equation of purpose with knowledge were applied to their deci-
sion to launch the War, knowing its likely effects on black Ameri-
cans, the moral indictment would be nearly unanswerable: they
knew exactly what they were doing, and they knew that blacks
were likely to bear the War's brunt.
II. THE HAVOC THE WAR HAS WROUGHT
The crucial question is whether the planners of the War on
Drugs ought to be held morally accountable for the havoc they
have wrought among the disadvantaged members of minority
groups. The answer is that they should. This section explains
why.
Two sets of issues arise. First, were the disparate impacts on
black Americans foreseeable? The only possible answer, as the
data presented in the following sections demonstrate beyond per-
adventure of doubt, is yes, they knew what they were doing. Sec-
ond, setting aside the War's disparate impact implications, were
there valid grounds for believing that the War's prohibitionistic
approach would diminish drug trafficking and drug use? The an-
swer is that there were no valid bases for believing that the War
would accomplish its ostensible objectives.
" Malcolm Gladwell, N.Y Crack Epidemic Appears to Wane: Seeing Drug's Destruc-
tiveness, Younger People are Turning Away, Washington Post Al (May 31, 1993).
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A. The Foreseeable Disparate Impact on Blacks
Urban black Americans have borne the brunt of the War on
Drugs. They have been arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and im-
prisoned at increasing rates since the early 1980s, grossly out of
proportion to their numbers in the general population or among
drug users. By every standard, the War has been harder on
blacks than on whites; that this was foreseeable makes it no less
regrettable.
The drugs primarily targeted by the War-cocaine and more
recently crack-are notoriously used and distributed in the inner
city. The political symbolism of cocaine has been high since the
mid-1980s. The United States invaded Panama in part because
Manuel Noriega was believed to be cooperating with Colombian
drug-lords.55 In the United States, the Medellin and Cali cartels
are among the best-known foreign business enterprises. Newspa-
pers, television, and movies regularly portray trafficking in co-
caine and crack as characteristic of inner-city minority neighbor-
hoods. Any minimally informed person in the late 1980s knew
that the major fronts in the drug wars were located in minority
neighborhoods.
Even if media stereotypes did not focus the drug war on mi-
nority neighborhoods, institutional characteristics of urban police
departments would have led to a tactical focus on disadvantaged
minority neighborhoods. For a variety of reasons, it is easier to
make arrests in socially disorganized neighborhoods than in ur-
ban blue collar and urban or suburban white collar neighbor-
hoods. First, more of the routine activities of life, including retail
drug-dealing, occur on the streets and alleys in poor neighbor-
hoods. In working-class and middle-class neighborhoods, many
activities including drug deals are likelier to occur indoors. This
difference means that it is much easier for police to find dealers
from whom to make an undercover buy in a disadvantaged urban
neighborhood than elsewhere.
Second, because of social disorganization in poor urban mi-
nority neighborhoods, it is easier for undercover narcotics officers
to penetrate networks of friends and acquaintances than in more
stable and closely knit working-class and middle-class neighbor-
hoods. The stranger buying drugs on the urban street corner or
in an alley, or overcoming local suspicions by hanging around for
' Linda P. Campbell, Noriega Surrenders to US: Obstacles May Hinder Prosecution,
Chi Trib 3-1 (Jan 4, 1990).
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a few days and then buying drugs, is commonplace. The sub-
stantial increases in the numbers of black and Hispanic police
officers in recent decades make undercover narcotics work in
such neighborhoods easier. A policeman of Irish or Polish descent
in the 1960s was much less likely to be successful working un-
dercover in a minority neighborhood than is a black policeman
today working in Chicago's Woodlawn area or an Hispanic police-
man in South Los Angeles.
A stranger trying to buy drugs in the working-class Highland
Park neighborhood around the Ford plant in St. Paul, Minnesota,
or in Highland Park, Illinois, a middle-class suburb of Chicago, is
likely to have much less success. Drugs are used and sold in both
places, but seldom in the streets and not to strangers. Police un-
dercover operations can succeed in such places, but they take
longer, cost more, and are less likely to succeed.
Both of these differences between socially disorganized urban
neighborhoods and other neighborhoods make extensive drug law
enforcement operations in the inner city more likely and, by po-
lice standards, more successful. *Because urban drug-dealing is
often visible, individual citizens, the media, and elected officials
more often pressure police to take action against drugs there
than in other kinds of neighborhoods. Although wholesale drug
arrests are seldom strategically successful in reducing drug use
or trafficking, they briefly disrupt the drug markets and win me-
dia and public approval."
There is another more powerful reason why the police focus
their attention on the inner city. Both for individual officers and
for departments, numbers of arrests have long been a convention-
al measure of productivity and effectiveness. If it takes more
work and time to make a single drug arrest in Highland Park
than in Woodlawn, the trade-off may be between two arrests per
month of an officer's time in Highland Park and eleven arrests
per month in Woodlawn. From the perspectives of the individual
officer's personnel record and the department's year-to-year sta-
tistical comparisons, arrests are fungible, and eleven arrests
count for more than two. A primary reason, therefore, for the
relatively higher rate of drug arrests in disorganized minority
communities than elsewhere is that they are easier to make.
' Lawrence W. Sherman, Police Crackdowns: Initial and Residual Deterrence, in Mi-
chael Tonry and Norval Morris, eds, 12 Crime and Justice: A Review of Research 1, 3, 17
(University of Chicago Press, 1990).
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Somewhat surprisingly, I am told by leading drug policy ex-
perts that there is no literature that confirms or contradicts this
analysis, or that considers why police target drug law enforce-
ment on minority communities. There are ethnographic and eco-
nomic literatures on urban drug markets, and there are police
and policy literatures on the tactics of street-level law enforce-
ment and undercover narcotics work. The ethnographic literature
documents the porousness of urban drug markets and, with the
economic literature, it explains why arrested dealers are nearly
always quickly replaced by successors willing to accept the risks;
but neither sheds light on police tactics. The police and policy
literatures explain how and why narcotics enforcement operates,
but shed no light on why the emphasis of this enforcement is so
much more often on the Woodlawns of America than on the High-
land Parks. 7
Experienced police officials and prosecutors do not disagree
with this analysis. Former Kansas City prosecutor Albert Riede-
rer, for example, is the first person who offered this analysis to
me. Alfred Blumstein, in a 1993 analysis of the War on Drugs,
offered a similar analysis and, because of the absence of litera-
ture on this issue, cited "personal communication with several
individuals involved in drug-related police work."58 Likewise, the
police chief in Charlottesville, Virginia, justifying police targeting
of casual drug dealing in University of Virginia fraternities, ob-
served that anti-drug efforts were "directed mainly at minorities
living in poor inner-city neighborhoods." 9
Regardless of the reason why it happens, the police emphasis
on disorganized minority neighborhoods produces racial arrest
rates that do not mirror racial proportions in drug use. Figure 2-
1 shows the percentages of blacks and whites among drug arres-
tees reported in the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports for the years
1976 to 1990. The black percentage climbed steadily throughout
the period, and by two-fifths-from 30 to 42 percent of the to-
tal-between 1985 and 1989. Because the absolute number of
arrests was also increasing, the number of arrests of blacks grew
even faster. As Table 2-1 shows, between 1985 and 1989 the
M See Reuter, MacCoun, and Murphy, Money from Crime (cited in note 39).
Alfred Blumatein, Making Rationality Relevant.The American Society of Criminolo.
gy 1992 Presidential Address, 31 Criminol 1, 4 n 3 (Feb 1993).
" B. Drummand Ayers, Drug Charges Embarass University of Virginia, NY Times 1-
26 (Mar 24, 1991).
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number of black arrests more than doubled, from 210,298 to
452,574. The number of white arrests grew by only 27 percent.
Figure 2-1
Percent U.S. Drug Abuse Violations, by Race, 1976-90
--White
Black
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice
Statistics-1978, table 4.7 at 485 (1979) ("1978 Sourcebook") 1979
Sourcebook, table 4.7 at 467; 1980 Sourcebook, table 4.7 at 345; 1981
Sourcebook, table 4.7 at 351; 1982 Sourcebook, table 4.7 at 403; 1983
Sourcebook, table 4.7 at 431; 1984 Sourcebook, table 4.8 at 483; 1985
Sourcebook, table 4.8 at 422; 1987 Sourcebook, table 4.8 at 378; 1988
Sourcebook, table 4.9 at 494; 1989 Sourcebook, table 4.9 at 432; 1990
Sourcebook, table 4.9 at 424; 1991 Sourcebook, table 4.9at 445.
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Table 2-1
U.S. Drug Abuse Violations by Race, 1976-90
Total
Year Violations White White % Black Black %
1976 475,209 366,081 77 103,615 22
1977 565,371 434,471 77 122,594 22
1978 592,168 452,728 78 127,277 21
1979 516,142 396,065 77 112,748 22
1980 531,953 401,979 76 125,607 24
1981 584,776 432,556 74 146,858 25
1982 562,390 400,683 71 156,369 28
1983 615,081 423,151 69 185,601 30
1984 560,729 392,904 70 162,979 29
1985 700,009 482,486 69 210,298 30
1986 688,815 463,457 67 219,159 32
1987 809,157 511,278 63 291,177 36
1988 844,300 503,125 60 334,015 40
1989 1,074,345 613,800 57 452,574 42
1990 860,016 503,315 59 349,965 41
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice
Statistics-1978 table 4.7 at 485 (1979) ("1978 Sourcebook"); 1979
Sourcebook table 4.7 at 467; 1980 Sourcebook table 4.7 at 345; 1981
Sourcebook table 4.7 at 351; 1982 Sourcebook table 4.7 at 403; 1983
Sourcebook table 4.7 at 431; 1984 Sourcebook table 4.8 at 483; 1985
Sourcebook table 4.8 at 422; 1986 Sourcebook table 4.8 at 422; 1987
Sourcebook table 4.8 at 378; 1988 Sourcebook table 4.9 at 494; 1989
Sourcebook table 4.9 at 432; 1990 Sourcebook table 4.9 at 424; 1991
Sourcebook table 4.9 at 445.
The arrest percentages by race bear no relation to drug use
percentages, as table 2-2 shows. Black Americans are less likely
to have used drugs in their lives than whites for all major drugs
of abuse except heroin. In 1990, for example, a year in which 41
percent of drug arrestees were black, NIDA's national household
survey on drug abuse reported that only 10 percent of blacks re-
ported that they had ever used cocaine (compared with 11.7 per-
cent of whites and 11.5 percent of Hispanics), 1.7 percent report-
ed ever using heroin (compared with 0.7 percent of whites and 1.2
percent of Hispanics), 31.7 percent reported ever using marihua-
na (compared with 34.2 percent of whites and 29.6 percent of
Hispanics), 3.0 percent reported ever using hallucinogens
(compared with 8.7 percent of whites and 5.2 percent of Hispan-
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ics), and 76.6 percent reported ever using alcohol (compared with
85.2 percent of whites and 78.6 percent of Hispanics).'
The data presented in Table 2-2 on cocaine use within the
last year and the last month do show higher levels of self-report-
ed use by blacks than by whites. Arguably, recent user percent-
ages are a better comparison to arrest percentages than are the
"ever-used" percentages. However, because the absolute number
of blacks is roughly one-seventh the number of whites, even the
recent user data cannot explain racial arrest patterns. Six-tenths
of one percent of 200 million whites would result in 1.2 million
cocaine users, compared with 1.7 percent of 30 million blacks, or
510,000 users. This comparison is exaggerated because it does
not adjust for children and the elderly. Nonetheless, the 12:5
ratio should be right. It would explain a black arrest percentage
under 30 percent, as it was before the mid-1980s. It would not
explain why blacks are 41 or 42 percent of persons arrested for
drug crimes. Table 2-2
U.S. Percent Drug Use, by Race, 1990
Alcohol Marijuana Cocaine Hallucinogens Heroin
Most ReentUse osRecent Use MostRcnt Use
Within Within Within Within Within Within
Ever last last Ever last last Ever last last Ever Ever
used year 30 days used year 30 days used year 30 days used used
White 85.2 68.3 53.1 34.2 10.1 5.0 11.7 2.8 0.6 8.7 0.7
Black 76.6 55.6 43.7 31.7 11.2 6.7 10.0 4.0 1.7 3.0 1.7
Hispanic 78.6 64.5 47.1 29.6 10.9 4.7 I1.5 5.2 1.9 5.2 1.2
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebeok of Criminal Justice Statistics-1992 tables 3.103, 3.104, 3.105, at 344-46 (1979).
Earlier, in explaining why the NIDA surveys are not fully
representative of the United States population, I pointed out that
they undercount disadvantaged and minority populations includ-
ing mobile young people, the homeless, and people in correctional
and mental health institutions. Since nearly half of prison and
jail inmates are black,61 and half to three-quarters of arrested
felons are drug users,62 adding these people into the NIDA sur-
veys would increase the black "ever-used" percentages. However,
the increases are unlikely to be large. As Table 1-3 shows, the
absolute levels of positive test results for heroin among black
arrestees in most DUF sites were low, and were generally lower
o 1991 Sourcebook, tables 3.103-3.105 at 356-58 (cited in note 44).
at See' 1992 Sourcebook, table 6.78 at 630, table 6.87 at 639 (cited in note 2).
s See table 1-1 at page 44.
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than those for white arrestees. Positive results for cocaine were
high, and higher than those for whites, but the rates for whites,
especially women, were substantial. Including the confined popu-
lation in NIDA's household survey would raise reported drug use
levels among blacks, but would also raise reported drug use lev-
els among whites (though not as much; prisoners are a much
smaller percentage of the white than of the black population).
The 1990 census, in what is acknowledged to be an
undercount, reported that thirty million Americans in 1990 were
black." Over a half million blacks were in prison or jail on an
average day in 1988." If all of them were cocaine users, they
would increase the estimated three million blacks (10 percent of
thirty million) who have ever used cocaine by 17 percent, which
might lift black "ever-used" rates to about the white and Hispan-
ic levels. The largest estimates of the black underclass in the so-
cial welfare literature are around three million.65 Even if all
these people are unrepresented in the NIDA surveys and a third
of them use drugs, both of which are unlikely, their inclusion
would not raise the "ever-used" percentages substantially. The
adjustment might raise black "ever-used" percentages for alcohol,
marihuana, and cocaine to the white levels; the hallucinogen gap,
however, looks too large to bridge.
Drug arrests are a principal reason why the proportions of
blacks in prison, and more generally under criminal justice sys-
tem control, have risen rapidly in recent years to the extraordi-
nary levels indicated in Figures 2-2 and 2-3 (which show the per-
centages of blacks and whites among persons admitted to prisons
and in prison on census dates over extended periods). The black
percentages climbed slowly for several decades but rapidly after
1980.
Statistical Abstract 1993, table 12 at 14 (cited in note 25).
1992 Sourcebook, table 6.38 at 596 (cited in note 2).
See generally Blacks in Poverty: An 'Underclass Exists,' But It's Small and Growing
Slowly Researchers Say, St Louis Post-Dispatch 6A (Feb 24, 1991).
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Figure 2-2
Admissions to Federal and State
Prisons by Race, 1960-89
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'Source: Patrick A. Langan, Race of Prisoners Admit-
ted to State and Federal Institutions, 1926-86 5 (Bu-
reau of Justice Statistics, 1991); Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract of the United States-1993 210
(1993).
Figure 2-3
Prisoners in State and Federal Prisons
on Census Date, By Race, 1960-90
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Source: Patrick A. Langan, Race of Prisoners Admitted to State and
Federal Institution, 1926-86 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1991);
Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States-
1993 210 (1993); Bureau of the Census, StatisticaiAbstract of the
United States-1971 155 (1993).
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The pattern of increasing black percentages is apparent in
both aggregate national data and state data on arrests. Figure -2-
4 shows national arrest rates per 100,000 people for whites and
non-whites from 1965 to 1991. Non-white rates are higher than
white rates, usually at least double, throughout that period.
From the early 1970s onward, white drug arrest rates were basi-
cally stable, fluctuating at about 300 per 100,000. After 1980,
non-white rates rose steadily and then skyrocketed until they
were five times higher than white rates by 1988.
Figure 2-4
Arrest Rates for Drug Offenses,
Juveniles, by Race, 1965-91
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Source: Alfred Blumstein, Making Rationality Relevant - The
American Society of Criminology 1992 Presidential Address,
31 Criminology 1, 16 (1993).
A more striking pattern of racial disparity is evident when
juvenile drug arrests by race are examined. Alfred Blumstein,
long-time dean of the Heinz School of Public Policy and Manage-
ment at Carnegie-Mellon University, and America's leading au-
thority on racial trends in criminal justice statistics, presented
Figure 2-5 as part of a 1992 presidential address to the American
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Society of Criminology.6 White arrest rates for juvenile drug
offenses were higher than those for black juveniles from the late
1960s to the early 1980s, although both rates fell sharply after
1974. After the early 1980s, white arrest rates continued to drop.
Figure 2-5
Arrest Rates for Drug Offenses,
Juveniles, by Race, 1965-91
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Source: Alfred Blumstein, Making Rationality Relevant-The American
Society of Criminology 1992 Presidential Address, 31 Criminology 1, 16
(1993).
Black rates shot up until the late 1980s when they were four to
five times higher than white rates. Blumstein's "our kids, their
kids" explanation for those trends is that drug use in the 1970s
was a middle-income, principally white phenomenon, which is
why enforcement severely dropped, while in the late 1980s, drug
use was a low-income, principally minority phenomenon, which is
why enforcement was uncompromisingly aggressive:
' Blumstein, Making Rationality Relevant at 5 (cited in note 58).
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The decline after the 1974 peak was undoubtedly a con-
sequence of the general trend toward decriminalization
of marijuana in the United States. A major factor con-
tributing to that decriminalization was undoubtedly a
realization that the arrestees were much too often the
children of individuals, usually white, in positions of
power and influence. Those parents certainly did not
want the consequences of a drug arrest to be visited on
their children, and so they used their leverage to
achieve a significant degree of decriminalization. 7
One irony attending the data on arrests is their juxtaposition
with drug use patterns. They are out of synch. During the late
1970s and early 1980s, when arrests were falling or essentially
stable, as previously shown by Figures 1-1 to 1-6,s' drug use
climbed to its modern peaks and began declining, well before ar-
rests and arrest rates began their steep climb.
Blumstein's analysis of national drug arrest trends by race is
mirrored in the states. Stevens Clarke of the Institute of Govern-
ment of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the pre-
eminent scholar of North Carolina criminal justice trends, reports
that drug arrests of non-whites in that state climbed five times
faster than white rates between 1984 and 1989.9 Non-white
drug arrests increased from 5,021 in 1984 to 14,192 in 1989, a
183 percent increase." White drug arrests increased from
10,269 in 1984, twice the non-white number, to 14,007 in 1989,
less than the black number, an increase of only 36 percent.71
Similar patterns exist in other states, as of course they must,
because the respective increases nationally in black and white
drug arrests between 1985 and 1989 were 115 and 27 percent
respectively.72
The drug war's effect on prison populations has been sub-
stantial, and since the mid-1980s it has been the single most im-
portant cause of prison population increases. Twenty-five percent
of state prisoners in 1991 had been convicted of drug charges, as
Id at 4.
See pages 30-36.
Stevens H. Clarke, North Carolina Prisons Growing, 3(4) Overcrowded Times 1, 12
(1992).
70 Id at 12.
71 Id.
7' Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-1986 table
4.8 at 300 (1987); Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statis-
tics-1990 table 4.9 at 424 (1991);
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had 56 percent of those in federal prisons. Twelve years earlier,
in 1979, a year for which a special population profile makes de-
tailed state data available, 6.4 percent of state inmates and 25
percent of federal inmates had been convicted of drug crimes.73
At every level of the criminal justice system, empirical analy-
ses demonstrate that increasing black disproportion has resulted
from the War on Drugs-in juvenile institutions,74 in jails,"
and in state76 and federal7 7 prisons. The experience in several
state prison systems is illustrative.
Figure 2-6 shows black and white admissions per 100,000
same-race population to North Carolina prisons from 1970 to
1990. White rates held steady during the entire period. Non-
white rates doubled between 1980 and 1990 from a higher start-
ing point, increasing most rapidly after 1987, the period when
non-white drug arrests more than doubled.
Figure 2-6
Prison Admissions per 100,000 General Population,
North Carolina, by Race, 1970 - 19901,000-
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Source: Stevens H. Clarke, North Carolina Prisons Growing, 3(4)
Overcrowded Times 1, 11-13 (1992).
7 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-1987 table
6.25 at 494 (1988); Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statis-
tics-1981 table 6.40 at 490 (1982).
", Howard N. Snyder, Arrests of Youth 1990, in Bureau of Justice Statistics, OJJDP
Update on Statistics 10 (1990) (noting that drug abuse arrest rates for non-blacks declined
during the 1980s, while drug abuse arrests for black youth increased by 200 percent be-
tween 1984 and 1989).
78 1992 Sourcebook, table 6.49 at 601 (cited in note 2).
76 1992 Sourcebook, table 6.70 at 623 (cited in note 2); Bureau of Justice Statistics,
National Corrections Reporting Program, 1989 table 1-1 at 8 (1989).
17 See United States Sentencing Commission, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A
Report on the Operation of the Guidelines System and Short-term Impacts on Disparity in
Sentencing Use of Incarceration, and Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bargaining (1991).
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Figure 2-7 shows increases in prison commitments in Penn-
sylvania for 1980 to 1990 for drug and other offenses by race and
sex. Drug commitments of black males increased by 1,613 per-
cent during the decade; white males by 477 percent. The pattern
for females was similar, although the differences by race were
less dramatic. In 1990, 11 percent of Pennsylvanians were black;
58 percent of state prisoners were black."8
Figure 2-7
Percent Growth in Prison Commitments
in Pennsylvania, by Race, Sex, and Offense, 1980 - 1990
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Source: Stover Clark, Pennsylvania Correction in Context, 3(4)
Overcrowded Times 4,5 (1992).
Figure 2-8 similarly shows white and non-white drug com-
mitments to Virginia prisons from 1983 to 1989. Sixty-two per-
cent of drug offenders committed in 1983 were white, 38 percent
were non-white. By 1989, however, those percentages had more
than reversed; 65 percent of drug commitments were non-white,
35 percent were white. Drug commitments have continued to rise
since 1989; current data would reveal an even more striking ra-
cial disproportion.
8 Stover Clark, Pennsylvania Corrections in Context, 3(4) Overcrowded Times 5
(1992).
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Figure 2-8
Percent of New Drug Commitments by Race, Virginia
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James Austin and David McVey, The 1989 N.C.C.D. Prison Population
Forecast: The Impact of the War on Drugs, National Council on Crime
and Delinquency Focus (Dec. 1989).
These figures are illustrative of prison admission and popu-
lation trends across the country. This worsening of racial incar-
ceration patterns, cast in the most charitable light to the officials
who launched and conducted America's latest War on Drugs, was
a foreseen but not intended consequence. Less charitably, the
recent blackening of America's prison population is the product of
malign neglect.
B. The Case for the War
There was no basis on which policymakers could have be-
lieved in good faith that the main strategies of the War on Drugs
would be so successful as to justify the burdens they would im-
pose on minority citizens. By trying principally to reduce the sup-
ply of drugs, rather than the demand for them, and by adopting a
prohibitionistic crime control approach, rather than a harm-re-
duction approach, policymakers chose strategies that had little
prospect of succeeding but a high likelihood of aggravating racial
disproportions in the criminal justice system.
The argument has two strands. The first concerns the evi-
dence for the effectiveness of drug-law enforcement per se. The
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second concerns the evidence on effectiveness of harsh crime con-
trol approaches generally.
A prefatory glossary may be helpful. Although it is an over-
simplified distinction, discussions of drug policy typically distin-
guish between supply reduction and demand reduction.79 Supply
reduction strategies aim to reduce the availability of drugs and,
by reducing supplies and increasing risks, to increase their pric-
es. The major supply reduction approaches are source-country
programs (crop eradication, financial support to other countries'
drug law enforcement agencies, and extraterritorial assignment
of American military and law enforcement personnel), interdic-
tion programs (border patrols, air and marine surveillance and
apprehension of importers, and baggage inspection at entry
points), and law enforcement efforts at local, state, federal, and
international levels aimed at arresting and punishing those in-
volved in drug trafficking.
Demand reduction strategies, by contrast, aim to persuade
people not to use drugs and not to buy them. The major demand
reduction approaches are mass-media public education, drug edu-
cation in elementary and secondary schools, drug abuse treat-
ment, and law enforcement aimed at the possession of drugs. In
addition (and this is why the broad distinction is oversimplified),
supply reduction efforts have collateral demand reduction effects
if their very existence and occurrence serve to create or reinforce
social norms antithetical to drug use.
A second conventional distinction is between prohibitionistic
and harm reduction strategies. Prohibitionistic strategies forbid
the use or distribution of drugs and attempt to enforce those pro-
hibitions by means of legal threats backed by the criminal justice
system. Drug use and users are stigmatized as deviant and im-
moral. Principal reliance is placed on legal sanctions and, partic-
ularly in the United States, when the legal threats prove ineffec-
tive, the tendency has been to threaten increasingly harsher pen-
alties. This tendency might be analogized to the American Viet-
nam War practice of responding by sending troops each time
sending more troops failed to win victory.
The logic of prohibitionistic approaches implies primary em-
phasis on supply reduction strategies and on the criminalization
of use, possession, and distribution of proscribed substances.
That is why drug law enforcement has been the principal cause
' See, for example, Stephen J. Schulhofer, Solving the Drug Enforcement Dilemma:
Lessons from Economics, 1994 U Chi Legal F 207, 216.
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of rapid prison population increases and why the United States
Congress and state legislatures in the 1980s repeatedly passed
sentencing laws calling for mandatory minimum sentences for
drug crimes.
Harm reduction strategies, by contrast, treat drug abuse as a
social problem having undesirable effects on drug users and soci-
ety, and attempt to minimize their aggregate adverse effects.
Adopting the public health perspective on health problems-that
it is more important to alleviate suffering and loss of health, life,
and property than to render moral judgments on individual be-
havior-does not place principal reliance on criminal processes
and legal threats. In the Netherlands, for example, although law
enforcement targets the importation and manufacture of drugs
and high-level trafficking, harm reduction approaches guide poli-
cy for handling social users, addicts, and user-dealers. ° Needle
exchange and methadone maintenance programs exist, serviced
from mobile medical units and from clinics.8' Addicts participate
fully in the Dutch social welfare system and are entitled to both
income support and health care. 2 Drug abuse treatment is
available on demand through the national health system." The
effects are to weaken the illicit drug markets, to reduce drug-
market-related violence, to reduce the health problems of drug-
users, and to reduce the spread of AIDS. Dutch authorities also
claim that their approach reduces crime generally by eliminating
the need for addicts to steal in order to support their addiction.
Moreover, they claim that their approach reduces drug use by
making it less beguiling to experimenting young people; addicts
are seen for what they are-inadequate welfare state cli-
ents-rather than countercultural outlaws symbolizing resistance
to bourgeois values."
No doubt drug warriors would challenge some or all of my
description of the Dutch experience. I believe, however, that it is
substantially accurate; more important, a picture of a harm-re-
duction approach has been sketched. In life, any country imagin-
able will simultaneously pursue elements of both prohibitionistic
and harm reduction strategies, as the Dutch do and the United
States does. The question is one of balance. In recent years, Ame-
o Ed Leuw, Drugs and Drug Policy in the Netherlands, in Michael Tonry, ed, 14
Crime and Justice: A Review of Research 263, 265 (University of Chicago Press, 1991).
" Id at 266-67.
82 Id at 257.
Id at 267.
Leuw, 14 Crime and Justice at 263-69 (cited in note 80).
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rican policy has tilted heavily toward prohibition. This is exem-
plified by a longstanding 70/30 federal funding split between law
enforcement programs and treatment and education programs."
Too many people in prison and too few in treatment are among
the results.
Every element of the supply reduction approach has been
shown to be ineffective. James Q. Wilson, the country's leading
conservative crime-control scholar, after surveying research and
experience through 1990, concluded that "significant reductions
in drug abuse will come only from reducing demand for those
drugs... . [Tihe marginal product of further investment in sup-
ply reduction is likely to be small. " ' Moreover, he reported that
"I know of no serious law-enforcement executive who disagrees
with this conclusion. Typically, police officials tell interviewers
that they are fighting either a losing war or, at best, a holding
action."87
Interdiction and source-country efforts have long been known
by policy analysts and evaluators to be ineffective, but, because
they have had relatively little effect on racial trends in prosecu-
tion and incarceration, little about them is said here. The prob-
lem with interdiction efforts is that the boundaries of the United
States are so long and so porous, and the volume of legitimate
movement across borders so large, that it is impossible to inter-
cept more than a small percentage of incoming drugs. A series of
RAND analyses and evaluations commissioned by the Depart-
ment of Defense agree." In addition, the cost of imported drugs
to U.S. distributors accounts for less than 10 percent of their
street price. A RAND analysis estimated that doubling the vol-
ume of intercepted drugs would increase street prices by only 10
percent.8 9
Knowledge about the effectiveness of source-country pro-
grams is even less encouraging. With the notable exception of
reductions in Turkish production of opium in the early 1970s that
temporarily interrupted the flow of heroin into the United States,
source-country programs have been ineffective. This is partly
Id at 271.
James Q. Wilson, Drugs and Crime, in Michael Tonry and James Q. Wilson, eds,
13 Crime and Justice-A Review of Research 534 (University of Chicago Press, 1990).
87 Id.
" Peter Reuter, Can the Borders be Sealed?, 92 Public Interest 51 (Summer 1989).
Peter Reuter, Gordon Crawford, and Jonathan Cave, Sealing the Borders: The Ef-
fects of Increased Military Participation in Drug Interdiction 96, 107 (Rand Corporation,
1988).
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because suitable conditions for growing cocaine, opium, and mari-
huana exist in many countries, and production can always shift
from less to more hospitable places. Many of these places, such
as in the Andes, the "Golden Triangle" of Thailand, Burma, and
Laos, and the mountainous regions of Southwest Asia, are out-
side effective control of any government. The ineffectiveness of
source-country programs partly results from the unavailability of
alternate cash crops for peasant farmers and of the economic
infrastructure for marketing them. Again quoting Wilson's sum-
mary, "... . we should not expect much gain from even sharply
increased [source-country efforts] ... It is a view shared by many
top federal law-enforcement officials."'
Domestic law enforcement, the principal remaining supply-
side strategy, has not had any greater demonstrated success. The
ultimate measure of the effectiveness of drug-control efforts at
reducing availability of drugs is their price. If drugs are getting
scarcer, simple economic theory tells us they should become more
costly. If the risks of arrest and incarceration associated with
drug sales are increasing, simple economic theory tells us that
those increased costs should be passed along and drugs should
become more costly. To the contrary, since the early 1980s, prices
of cocaine have fallen steadily, and prices of heroin have alternat-
ed between stability and decline. 1
There are at least two other places to look for evidence of
positive effects of supply-side efforts. One is to look at the litera-
ture on the effects of efforts to deter sales by increasing penal-
ties. The most deliberate and publicized increase of drug penal-
ties in this country occurred in the early 1970s in New York
when the "Rockefeller Drug Laws" mandated harsh prison terms
for traffickers and forbade plea bargaining that would avoid man-
datory sentences.' A massive multiyear evaluation concluded
that implementation of the laws had no effect on drug trafficking,
drug use, or drug-related health problems.9"
® Wilson, Drugs and Crime at 531 (cited in note 86).
91 Mark H. Moore, Supply Reduction and Drug Law Enforcement, in Michael Tonry
and James Q. Wilson, eds, 13 Crime and Justice-A Review of Research 125 (University
of Chicago Press, 1990).
'2 Joint Committee on New York Drug Law Evaluation, The Nation's Toughest Drug
Law: Evaluating the New York Experiences 3-12 (Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, 1977); 1973 NY Laws 276, 277, 278, 676, 1051; 1975 NY Laws 785, 832; 1976 NY
Laws 480.
93 Id.
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Yet another approach is to look at the effects of street
sweeps in which police saturate an area in order to eliminate
drug dealing. This tactic is highly popular with the public and
with some drug policy scholars, but the best evidence is that such
sweeps move the drug markets around and, at least for some
time, make drugs harder to find for some buyers; overall they
have no effect on the volume of drug trafficking in a metropolitan
area. Arrested dealers are quickly replaced by others willing to
accept the risks in order to win the rewards.94
It is important to pause here to note that temporary disrup-
tion of the drug markets, and demonstration to neighborhood
residents that the police will act to drive drug dealers out, are
legitimate policy goals. As a minor part of a comprehensive drug
strategy that emphasizes treatment and education, such tactics
have a place. In the Reagan-Bush War on Drugs, however, law
enforcement was the principal tactic, and was backed up by se-
vere penalties that have crowded the prisons but not reduced
cocaine use or prices.
One last approach is to stop up the lens to look generally at
the evidence on crime-preventive efforts, particularly harsh pen-
alties and "war-against" rhetoric. The War on Drugs was, after
all, but one in a series of wars against crime waged by the Rea-
gan and Bush administrations. If vigorous enforcement, and
harsher and tougher penalties, can be shown to reduce crime
generally, perhaps the War on Drugs can be justified as a specific
application of that general proposition.
Here, too, the evidence is no more convincing. Although Rea-
gan and Bush administration crime bills year after year in-
creased penalties and extended mandatory minimum sentences
for additional drug crimes, a conservative Sentencing Commis-
sion toughened penalties even more and insisted on their applica-
tion, and prison populations tripled from 1980 onwards, there is
little reason to conclude that crime was much reduced. On man-
datory penalties, a considerable literature instructs that they
have no, little, or transient deterrent effects. 5
More generally, it has long been established, in this country
and elsewhere, that imaginable increases in penalties are likely
9' Marcia Chaiken, ed, Street Level Enforcement-Examining the Issues 13 (National
Institute of Justice, 1988).
" Sherman, Police Crackdowns (discussing the effects of police crackdowns that make
punishment more certain) (cited in note 56). See also Michael Tonry, Mandatory Penalties,
in Michael Tonry, ed, 16 Crime and .Justice-A Review of Research 243 (University of
Chicago Press, 1992).
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to achieve, at most, modest crime reduction through deterrence
or incapacitation. The most recent authoritative survey of the
subject comes from the National Academy of Sciences Panel on
the Understanding and Control of Violence, created with support
from the Reagan and Bush administration Departments of Jus-
tice, and composed of nationally prominent public officials and
scholars. The Panel's origins and sources of funding are described
to emphasize that it was a nonpartisan, establishmentarian effort
of such credibility that both recent Republican regimes supported
it. The fundamental question the Panel addressed: "What effect
has increasing the prison population had on levels of violent
crime?" The answer: "Apparently, very little."'
The last twenty years have provided a natural laboratory for
assessing the effects of harsher penalties on behavior. Along with
the trebled prison population since 1980, the Panel observed that
"[wihile average prison time served per violent crime roughly tri-
pled between 1975 and 1989, reported levels of serious violent
crime varied around the level of 2.9 million a year.... If tripling
the average length of incarceration per crime had a strong pre-
ventive effect, then violent crime rates should have declined."97
That experience is not compatible with any substantial deter-
rence effect because violent crime rates "generally rose after
1985."98
Appropriate skepticism about punitive crime control policies
in general or about supply-side drug control strategy in particu-
lar does not mean that drugs should be legalized or that there
are no social benefits from law enforcement efforts. Drug law en-
forcement, for example, through its clear message that drug traf-
ficking is illegal and wrong, may help reinforce social norms
against drug use. For so long as private drug sales remain illegal,
no one can disagree with enforcement efforts targeted at distribu-
tors, manufacturers, and importers. Similarly, few would argue
that it is inappropriate to try to stop the flow of drugs through
airports, tollbooths, and seaports, or that police should not make
arrests in drug-ridden neighborhoods to protect the right of resi-
dents to live in a safe and congenial environment. Even modest
investments in source-country and extraterritorial interdiction
Albert J. Reiss, Jr. and Jeffrey A. Roth, eds, Understanding and Preventing Vio-
lence 6 (National Academy Press, 1993).
97 Id.
98 Id.
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programs may be justifiable, albeit largely for dramaturgical reasons.
Much less need be said about demand-side tactics because
the evidence is so much more positive. A sizable literature now
documents the effectiveness of school-based drug education at
reducing drug experimentation and use among young people."
Another sizable literature documents the capacity of drug-abuse
treatment programs to reduce drug use and drug-related
crime. 00 There is no credible literature that can document the
effects of mass-media campaigns on drug use, but it is not unrea-
sonable to believe that such campaigns ("Just say 'No'") have
reinforced changing social norms that have led to across-the-
board declines in drug use in the United States since 1980.
Supply-side strategy has a role, but so does demand-side
strategy. The choice between them is a false one. The question is
one of balance, and, in setting that balance, the likely effects of
alternate choices on members of minority groups are ethically an
inexorably relevant consideration. It is hard to imagine any legit-
imate rationale for the decision by the drug war's designers to
adopt policies that were unlikely to achieve its ostensible goals
and that were foreordained disproportionately to affect disadvan-
taged black Americans. Is there any arguable basis for justifying
the War's foreseeable effects on black Americans? Particularly,
what should be made of the standard defense of the War's racial
effects, almost a confession in avoidance, that most crime is intr-
aracial and that the War's strategies were devised not to damage
blacks but to protect black victims and black communities?
C. Justifying the Unjustifiable
It seems a bit odd in the 1990s to be having to explain why
the adoption of policies with foreseeable racially disparate effects
is a bad thing. Avoidance of unwanted side effects and rejection
of iatrogenic policy options seems obviously right.
Consider, for example, the questions of registration of per-
sons who are HIV positive and of notification of infection to fami-
ly members and other intimates. Homosexuals have consistently
" See Gilbert J. Botvin, Substance Abuse Prevention: Theory, Practice, and Effective.
ness, in Michael Tonry and James Q. Wilson, eds, 13 Crime and Justice-A Review of Re-
search 461, 462-63 (University of Chicago Press, 1990). See also Phyllis L. Ellickson and
Robert M. Bell, Prospects for Preventing Drug Use Among Young Adolescents 36 (Rand
Corporation, 1990).
" See M. Douglas Anglin and Yih-Ing Hser, Treatment of Drug Abuse, in Michael
Tonry and James Q. Wilson, eds, 13 Crime and Justice: A Review of Research 393 (Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1990).
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opposed registration laws and notification policies because of
fears that these policies would be stigmatizing and would ad-
versely affect homosexuals as a group.01 Public health officials'
views have changed over time. In the mid-1980s, many supported
registration policies and contact-tracing.0 2 More recently, be-
cause of concern that registration might deter people from being
tested for HIV, most public health officials have been op-
posed.0 3 Few such policies have been adopted in part from re-
spect for homosexuals' concerns about their potential disparate
impact.0 4
In employment discrimination law, proof of disparate impact
on women or members of minority groups is enough to create
inferences of discriminatory intent and to shift burdens of
proof.105 As a matter of policy, de facto discrimination on racial
or ethnic grounds is as damaging to the people affected as de jure
discrimination; the law's failure to treat them identically results
not from a judgment that one form of discrimination is less
harmful than another, but from practical concerns. Whether re-
mediable by the courts or not, many claims of innocent de facto
discrimination meet with skeptical reactions from bystanders.
There are a number of other ways to think about the ethical
justification of the War on Drugs's disparate impact on blacks.
The criminal law's mens rea analyses, for example, offer the law's
most highly developed schema for analyzing culpability and mor-
al responsibility. In the criminal law, purpose and knowledge are
equally culpable states of mind. An action taken with a purpose
to kill, for example, is no more culpable than an action taken
with some other purpose but with knowledge that death would
result. Blowing up an airplane to kill a passenger is equivalent to
blowing up an airplane to destroy a fake painting and thereby to
defraud an insurance company, knowing that the passengers will
be killed. They are both murder. Most people would find the lat-
ter killing the more despicable.
Under the Model Penal Code, in which purpose and knowl-
edge are alternate mental states of murder, a person acts know-
ingly concerning the results of conduct if "he is aware that it is
"' See David Eisner, Stricter HIV Reporting Worries AIDS Activists, Chi Trib 1-7 (Apr
26, 1994).
102 See Nina Bernstein, The Secret Life of Aids, Newsday 7 (Jan 15, 1993).
"c See Elsner, Chi Trib at 1-7 (cited in note 101).
104 See Bernstein, Newsday at 7 (cited in note 102).
"o See Griggs v Duke Power Co., 401 US 424 (1971).
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practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result."'O'
He acts recklessly if he "consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that [the harm] ... will result from his con-
duct." °7 By either mens rea analogy, the War's planners are
morally culpable for the racial disparities their policies produced.
By analogy to the criminal law, the moral responsibility of the
architects of contemporary crime control policies is the same as if
their primary goal had been to lock up disproportionate numbers
of young blacks.
The planners of the War on Drugs fare no better under the
criminal law's actus reus analysis. Although the common law im-
posed no criminal responsibility for harms caused by omissions,
unless the actor had put the victim at risk or had some duty for
her care, this is almost universally regarded as a retrograde doc-
trine. If with no significant risk to himself, an individual can
save a child from drowning in a shallow pool, why shouldn't he?
In any case, regardless of what the criminal law provides, most
people would hold the bystander morally responsible. If the plan-
ners of the War on Drugs could have adopted policies that would
not have blighted the lives of so many young black Americans, as
of course they could have, are they not morally responsible for
having failed to do so?
Thus, there are a number of modes of analysis that condemn
the conscious adoption of policies foreseeably detrimental to
blacks. One final step is to examine defenses that have been or
could be put forward by conservative crime controllers to justify
the racial disparities they caused.
1. "Don't blame us."
The "don't blame us" defense posits that, in a democracy,
public officials respond to the fears and preferences of the elector-
ate, and, in the 1980s, the "public" was concerned about crime
and drug abuse; the public wanted a drug war, and the federal
government was simply, and rightly, giving the public what it
wanted.10
The shortcoming of "don't blame us" is that it gets the causal
chain backwards. Throughout the 1980s, and earlier, conserva-
tive politicians used "law and order" (remember Willie
Horton? 9) as an emotional issue to curry favor with voters, in
" Model Penal Code § 2.02 (ALI, 1962).
107 Id.
" John DiIulio, No Escape 71 (Basic Books, Inc., 1991).
'09 Timothy J. McNulty, Angry Dukakis Rips Soft-On-Crime Label, Chi Trib 3-1 (Oct
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effect heightening voters' fears and then promising to assuage
them. Common law and street criminals do not vote very much
and do not evoke much sympathy from those who do vote. They
are also disproportionately members of ethnic and racial minori-
ties. It was easy to provoke voters' fears and, as both Dukakis's
fumbling of the crime issue and the immobilizing fears of many
elected officials to be portrayed as "soft on crime" attest, it was
difficult for others to dampen these fears.
Almost all the premises underlying the "don't blame us" de-
fense were wrong. First, as explained above, there is no basis for
a claim of a good faith belief that harsh crime control policies can
achieve their ostensible objectives."
Second, although politicians' harping on rising crime rates
made the public believe that crime was increasing, all of the evi-
dence points the other way. FBI data on reported crimes showed
that reported rates of all serious crimes fell from 1980 through
1984 and rose slowly thereafter (during the height of toughened
crime control initiatives) to levels for many crimes in 1992 that
remained below those in 1980."' The other source of national
data on crime trends, data on victimization collected by the Bu-
reau of the Justice Statistics, showed that victimization rates for
all serious crimes (except murder) declined steadily during the
1980s."
Third, politicians' claims that the public "wanted" tougher
crime policies were disingenuously based on misleading poll re-
sults. It is true that, when asked simplistic questions such as
"Are the sentences judges impose too harsh, too lenient, or about
right?", most people will answer "too harsh," and they have done
so for as long as such questions have been asked. Relying on such
results as the basis for policy is no more warranted than relying
on similar off-the-cuff answers to pollsters' questions about for-
eign policy or support of DNA research.
A huge body of available public opinion data shows that
Americans have complicated opinions about crime and punish-
ment, just as honest public officials do."' Most people want to
20, 1988).
"o See page 28.
' Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports-1992 table 1 at 58
(1992).
.12 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal Victimization 1992 1 (1993).
113 See, for example, Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion, Crime, and Criminal Justice,
in Michael Tonry, ed, 16 Crime and Justice: A Review of Research 99 (University of Chi-
cago Press, 1992).
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see offenders published, for example, but they also want to see
them rehabilitated. 114 Americans believe that many offenders
should be sentenced to meaningful community-based penalties
rather than to prison. Americans believe that a disadvantaged
upbringing is the primary cause of crime and want to see efforts
made to rehabilitate offenders.' Surveys show that people who
do not want their taxes increased to pay for more prisons would
support tax increases to support drug treatment and other reha-
bilitative programs." 8 Similar findings exist in Australia, Eng-
land and Wales, Canada, Germany, Scotland, and the Scandi-
navian countries. Complicated problems elicit complicated reac-
tions."7
The point is not that Americans lack punitive instincts. They
have them. But they also have other more generous instincts that
policy makers can encourage or ignore. The architects of recent
crime control policies chose to ignore them.
2. "It's their own fault."
The "it's their own fault" argument is that every person has
the power to decide whether to commit a crime. If the govern-
ment broadcasts the message, "Do the crime, do the time," and
blacks continue to commit crimes, too bad. James Q. Wilson, the
leading conservative crime scholar, attributes crime to defects in
character. Wilson has argued that "the best way to reduce rac-
ism ... is to reduce the black crime rate to equal the white crime
rate" and has suggested that "decent black people" have special
responsibility for doing so." 8 As President Bush's 1992 drug
strategy expressed it, "drug use is the result of bad decisions by
individuals exercising free will."" 9
If only life were so simple. At least in our culture, it is axi-
omatic that people are responsible for the moral choices they
make. However, we know that individual behavior can be predict-
ed and that the combination of being poor, being raised in a sin-
gle-parent welfare household, being ill-educated, and having few
or no marketable job skills is a powerful predictor of crime, drug
114 Id at 131.
118 Id at 130.
116 Nigel Walker and Michael Hough, eds, Public Attitudes in Sentencing: Surveys
from Five Countries 41 (Gower Publishing Co., 1988).
11 Id at 218-23.
1' James Q. Wilson, To Prevent Riots, Reduce Black Crime, Wall St Journal A16 (May
6, 1992).
"' ONDCP, 1992 National Drug Control Strategy 3 (1992).
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abuse, and drug trafficking. We also know from ethnographic and
self-report studies of drug dealing that the promised financial
rewards are a powerful inducement to disadvantaged young peo-
ple. '2 When disadvantaged kids often make choices that privi-
leged kids seldom make, it is hard to believe that they do so sim-
ply because they are bad people. Instead, they do it because they
face conditions of life that make the wrong choice look like the
right one. Unless we are prepared to conclude (I'm not) that dis-
advantaged kids are made from substandard human raw materi-
al, there is no alternative to accepting that their conditions of life
have much to do with the choices they make.
Americans do believe that people should be held accountable,
but we also know that social and economic conditions predispose
people for and against crime and drug dealing. This is why disad-
vantaged minority youth are far likelier than affluent youths of
any race to sell drugs and commit crimes.
Like most of life's hard problems, this one has no easy an-
swers. The answer that "it's their own fault" for not resisting
peer and subcultural pressures, for not acting like middle-class
suburban kids, has an obvious consequence-vast numbers of
disadvantaged minority youth are entangled in the tentacles of
the criminal justice system. Some people have much harder cho-
ices to make than others do, and we do them and ourselves a
disservice in pretending otherwise. "It's their own fault" is an
adequate explanation for why so many young blacks are in prison
or jail for drug crimes only if we do not care about the reasons
they commit these crimes or about the resulting racial dispari-
ties.
3. "It's not unconstitutional."
A third defense, "it's not unconstitutional," contends that,
despite their foreseeable disparate impact on blacks, punitive
crime-control strategies were not wrong because they were not
unconstitutional. This is a nonsequitur. It is true that, since
Washington v Davis,2' an intent to discriminate must be shown
in order to establish a civil rights claim under the Constitution.
Because courts will not look behind the ostensible crime- and
drug-use reduction goals claimed for anti-crime and anti-drug
12 Reuter, MacCoun, and Murphy, Money from Crime at 102-05 (cited in note 39);
Philippe Bourgois, In Search of Horatio Alger: Culture and Ideology in the Crack Econo-
my, 16 Contemporary Drug Problems 619-49 (Winter 1989).
121 426 US 229, 239 (1976).
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policies, the unconstitutionality claim can be set aside. However,
that a policy is not unconstitutional does not make it right, or
even not wrong. One need only look at the Supreme Court's
death penalty jurisprudence to see that law and morality some-
times march in different directions.
4. "We are concerned about black victims."
Last, there is the "we are concerned about black victims and
black communities" defense. As Attorney General Barr put it, "a
failure to incarcerate criminals would result in disproportionate
harm to law-abiding black citizens."122 Fleshed out, the argu-
ment is that most crime is intraracial; that drug trafficking is
associated with guns, gangs, and violence; that drug markets
ruin neighborhoods and make it nearly impossible for law-abid-
ing people to enjoy the peace and stability that should be every
person's right; and that the War on Drugs was launched to vindi-
cate that right. All the empirical statements that precede the last
semicolon are true. What is false is the final clause. As previous
parts of this essay demonstrate, the cure does not follow from the
diagnosis.
A variation on the concern-for-black-victims defense is the
assertion that black inner-city residents want the police to close
down street markets and to arrest drug dealers, and that failure
to do these things would be a form of prejudice against blacks.
This also is a half-true argument. Presumably, virtually no one
wants to live in a neighborhood in which drug dealing is com-
mon, in which gangs are active, in which children cannot be al-
lowed out-of-doors, or in which ordinary citizens feel at risk. Mi-
nority citizens want help from the police in dealing with acute
problems, even if the young men and women who will be arrested
are their neighbors' sons and daughters, nieces and nephews. In
a crisis, people need help and ask for it, and the police are often
the only source of available help. There seems little reason to
doubt that minority citizens want order brought to their commu-
nities.
Requesting help in a crisis, and supporting harsh crime and
drug control strategies with racially disparate impacts, are not
the same thing. The relevant distinction is between acute and
chronic problems. Recent crime-control policies treat crime and
drug trafficking as if they were only acute problems: apply a de-
122 William Barr, The Case for More Incarceration 19 (Office of Policy Development,
1992).
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terrence and incapacitation poultice and the ailment will be
cured. Inner-city crime and drug abuse and related social pathol-
ogies, however, are not acute problems amenable to easy solu-
tions. They are symptoms of chronic social and economic condi-
tions shaping disadvantaged inner-city communities and the life
chances of people within them.
My guess-and I know of no directly applicable data-is that
law-abiding minority citizens would much prefer policy solutions
that preponderantly treat crime and drug abuse as chronic than
as acute conditions. That people in frustration and desperation
want to see their neighbors' children and their children's friends
locked up (virtually no one wants to see their own children incar-
cerated) does not mean that they would not prefer policies that
make the locking-up less likely. Given the choice, minority citi-
zens would greatly prefer social policies that made it less likely
that so many minority young people would wind up living lives in
which crime and drugs are common. Most parents want good
lives and rich opportunities for their children, and for other peop-
les' children. People who live in disadvantaged minority commu-
nities are not likely to have any lesser hopes for their children.
There is some evidence to support the preceding paragraph's
speculations. First, there are chilling reports that large percent-
ages of black Americans see contemporary crime and drug poli-
cies as a near-genocidal effort by whites to control blacks. Uni-
versity of Chicago law professor Norval Morris describes a semi-
nar with black maximum security inmates in Stateville Prison in
which patterns of race, crime, and punishment were discussed; of
twenty-six prisoners present, only three doubted that American
drug and crime control policies were a genocidal (their word) as-
sault on blacks by whites.'23 Thomas and Mary Edsall, in their
1991 book, Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Tax-
es on American Politics, describe focus groups held in the late
1980s under both Democratic and Republican party auspices; in
every session with black participants, the view was expressed
that crime and drug control policies are a conscious effort to un-
dermine black communities. 24 A Democratic pollster, Ed Reilly,
similarly reported a belief among Northern urban blacks "that
there is an organized approach to keep them [blacks] isolated
from mainstream America, that the government system is rigged
"' Personal communication with Norval Morris.
' Thomas Edsall and Mary Edsall, Chain Reaction 237 (W.W. Norton & Company
Inc., 1991).
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to keep then in poverty."125 A New York Times/WCBS-TV news
poll in 1990 likewise found that 29 percent of blacks (only 5 per-
cent of whites) thought it was true or might be true that the HIV
virus was "deliberately created in a laboratory in order to infect
black people," that 60 percent (16 percent of whites) believed it
was true or might be true that government makes drugs avail-
able "in poor black neighborhoods in order to harm black people,"
and that 77 percent believed government "singles out and investi-
gates black elected officials in order to discredit them."'26
Second, evidence from public opinion surveys over many
years reveals that much larger percentages of blacks than whites
believe that government has social welfare responsibilities to its
citizens. In one recent poll, blacks by 64 to 36 percent stated that
they believed the federal government had a responsibility to
guarantee every adult a job and a good standard of living (whites
came out the other way, by 66 to 34 percent). During most of the
1980s, whites split evenly on whether government should in-
crease spending for improved services; blacks were in favor by
margins as high as 77 to 23 percent.2 7 According to surveys
conducted from 1975 to 1989, 36 to 64 percent of blacks believed
government has an obligation to help blacks improve their living
standard. 2 ' Only 12 to 20 percent of whites agreed, and 60 per-
cent of whites disagreed. 2 ' With similar and sometimes
sharper racial contrasts, blacks supported and whites opposed
more spending on welfare, on income redistribution, and on im-
proving conditions in cities. 30
CONCLUSION
Crime and drug abuse do disproportionately affect disadvan-
taged minority communities. The amelioration of their effects
should be a paramount policy priority. So much is clear. Racially
sensitive policies would, however, take account of foreseeable ra-
cially disparate impacts as well as the policy's likely instrumen-
tal effects.
"' Id.
12 Jason DeParle, Talk of Government Being Out to Get Blacks Falls on More Atten-
tive Ears, NY Times B7 (Oct 29, 1990).
127 Edsall and Edsall, Chain Reaction at 258 (cited in note 124).
1" Floris Wood, ed, An American Profile: Opinions and Behavior, 1972 - 1989 506
(Gale Research Inc., 1990).
129 Id.
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All that is left is politics, the fifth and real reason why the
War on Drugs targeted young blacks. Stereotypes of Willie
Horton and law-and-order appeals were cynical efforts to win
elections and public support by raising peoples' fears and pander-
ing to their basest instincts. The title of a Time story in 1991
tells it all: "Why Bigotry Still Works at Election Time: When Pol-
iticians Rail about Crime, Welfare, or Big Government, They Are
Often Really Talking About Race." 3' The War on Drugs and
the set of harsh crime-control policies in which it was enmeshed
were launched to achieve political, not policy, objectives. It is the
adoption for political purposes of policies with foreseeable dispa-
rate impacts, the use of disadvantaged black Americans as means
to achievement of white politicians' electoral ends, that must in
the end be justified. It cannot.
131 Dan Goodgame Washington, Why Bigotry Still Works at Election Time: When Poli-
ticians Rail About Crime, Welfare or Big Government, They Are Often Really Talking
About Race, Time 44 (Nov 25, 1991).

